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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT COR-
PORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REX L. SOHM and KAT H R Y N 
SOHM, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
vs. 
RICHARD H. NICKLES, dba ZION 
MANAGEMENT, 
Third Party Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
9865 
On page one of his brief the appellant sets forth quite 
accurately the nature of the case and its disposition in the 
lower court. The lower court found correctly that appel-
lant, Richard H. Nickles, and his employee made fraudu-
lent misrepresentations to the Respondents, Rex L. and 
Kathryn Sohm and properly entered judgment against 
appellant from which appeal is now before the court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the year 1960, appellant operated a business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, under the name of Zion Management. He 
sold a product called the "Westinghouse Speed-0-Light 
Electronic Range" (R. 11, 135). 
Nickles employed a woman, Patricia Strong, to dem-
onstrate the range to prospective customers and did so dur-
ing the months of June and July, 1960 (R. 157). She made 
a demonstration and an oral presentation to prospective 
customers. For the demonstration she would cook a piece 
of bacon, a piece of weiner and boil water (R. 134). On 
June 28, 1960, she made such a demonstration to respon-
dents who went to appellant's place of business to investi-
gate the Electronic Range (R. 54, 55). Mr. Sohm is an 
architect and interested in new ideas especially since he 
was planning to build a new home (R. 64). In connection 
with this demonstration Patricia Strong made numerous 
representations about the Electronic Range which are dis-
cussed in Argument, Point I. After talking to the demon-
strator, respondents talked briefly to an unidentified man 
and was then ushered into Mr. Nickles' office who reiter-
ated many of the representations made by Mrs. Strong and 
added a few as discused in Argument, Point I. Believing 
the representations to be true and in reliance on them the 
respondents agreed to purchase the range (R. 65). 
The unit was delivered and installed on or about July 
3, 1960, (R. 67) by people retained by appellant for that 
purpose (R. 143). The respondents left on vacation and 
were gone about a week so did not begin using the range 
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until about July 10, 1960 (R. 82). While on vacation they 
talked to a sister and brother-in-law and made their only 
referral which resulted in a sale of a range to the Max 
Moffetts on or about July 14, 1960 (R. 170). 
After the respondents commenced to use the range 
they found it would not do many of the things as repre-
sented as set forth in Argument, Point II. Mrs. Sohm com-
plained to Nickles numerous times and even wrote to W es-
tinghouse on his suggestion (R. 83, Ex. 7) without success. 
After talking to Nickles Mrs. Sohm tried to follow recipes 
and give the range a fair chance. She also tried using it 
without the other units as Nickles continued to maintain 
could be done. She tried for a month or two but had to re-
vert back to her other units (R. 83). 
It could be used for limited things like hot dogs, bacon, 
baked potatoes (if carefully picked for size, R. 108, 109), 
hamburger or for warming over left overs but other things 
were not satisfactory (R. 84). 
A similar experience with similar representation was 
had by a witness called by respondent, Mrs. La Verda Peter-
son (R. 90-98). The testimony of Mrs. Peterson was pre-
sented under the belief that her purchase of a range was 
made January 11, 1960 (R. 89) when, in fact, it was pur-
chased in January, 1961. Over objections of respondents 
the testimony of this witness was stricken from the record 
(R. 100). Respondents contend it should be allowed to 
stand for two reasons: that it is corroborating testimony 
showing Nickles was making the same representations six 
months later despite being made aware of the limitations 
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by Sohms (R. 98) and that it is corroborating testimony to 
show performance of the range was unsatisfactory and not 
as represented. 
Thereafter, respondents stopped making payments to 
Universal C.I. T. Corporation, and as a result this action 
was initiated on January 23, 1962. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
FINDING THAT FRAUDULENT MISREPRE-
SENTATIONS WERE MADE BY APPELLANT 
AND HIS EMPLOYEE WHILE IN THE CON-
DUCT OF SAID EMPLOYMENT INTENDED 
TO AND DID INDUCE RESPONDENTS TO 
PURCHASE A WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRON-
IC RANGE. 
There is no dispute about the First Finding that Ap-
pellants sold the range to Respondents on or about June 
28th, 1960. The Second Finding is as follows: 
"2. Said Third Party Defendant (Appellant) 
and his agents, in order to sell said Electronic Range 
to Third Party Plaintiff (Respondents) made the 
following representations of an existing fact: 
"A. That the Electronic Range would do any-
thing a regular oven and surface unit would do and 
that no other unit would be necessary except for a 
griddle for cooking hot cakes. 
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"B. That the Electronic Range would fry eggs, 
bake bread, cook breakfast cereal, and can fruit. 
"C. That the cooking could be done in regular 
tableware including Melmac" (R. 40, 41). 
The law applicable in this case is that stated in Green-
well v. Duvall, 9 Ut. 2nd 89. This is more recent case than 
Pace v. Parish referred to by appellant. This case holds 
as follows: 
"Most of such cases involve the setting aside 
or modification of a written instrument. In order 
to do that, whether on the grounds of fraud, mutual 
mistake, lack of mutuality or for other reasons the 
grounds must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence. Such cases have little weight in establish-
ing that a fraudulent representation which does not 
involve setting aside or modifying a written instru-
ment must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence. Many cases hold that only a preponder-
ance of the evidence is necessary to prove a fraudu-
lent representation which does not involve the set-
ting aside or modification of a written instrument." 
In this case, however, as in the Greenwell case the 
court need not decide this question of evidence for, as we 
will show, there is clear and convincing evidence of fraud. 
IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDING NO. 2A: 
"That the Electronic Range would do anything 
a regular oven and surface unit would do and that 
no other unit would be necessary except for a grid-
dle for cooking hot cakes." We submit the following: 
There does not appear to be any substantial contention 
either in the appellant's brief or in the record that such 
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a representation was not made, in fact, the record would 
almost indicate that no exception was made since the dem-
onstrator did not remember limiting the use of the range 
in regards to hot cakes, in fact, said she cooked them (R. 
159) . Respondents advised the demonstrator and Mr. 
Nickles of the size of their family as being six (R. 58). 
DEMONSTRATOR'S STATEMENTS AS TOLD BY WIT-
NESS MRS. SOHM: 
The range would cover all of the cooking 
needs of respondent's family, and they would not 
need any other unit (R. 56). 
That the range would cook anything that re-
spondents used for their family (R. 57). 
"A. I recall that I asked about putting up 
fruit, because if I didn't have a range top how 
would I put the fruit up. 
"A. She said, 'Well this covers all of the cook-
ing needs'. She said, 'I don't know exactly in regard 
to putting up fruit, but I will get the information 
for you. I am sure that if it performs all of the 
cooking needs that it will do that also' (R. 58)." 
The demonstrator's doubt was not whether 
it would can fruit but as to the procedure. 
Question to Demonstrator: "Did you ever have 
anyone ask you if they could take out their regular 
cooking units and use your electronic range instead. 
"A. Gosh, I don't - I couldn't answer specif-
ically. I couldn't really recall (R. 163) ." 
NICKLES' STATEMENTS AS TOLD BY WITNESS 
MRS. SOHM: 
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After talking to the demonstrator they were intro-
duced to a gentleman who asked them if they would like 
to purchase an oven : 
"and we said, 'If it performs - if it is the unit 
they claim, it would be a wonderful unit to have, and 
we will talk to Mr. Nickles.' We went to see Mr. 
Nickles and he talked to us further about the oven 
(R. 63). 
"Q. What did he say then in regard to the 
oven? 
"A. We were concerned about its performing 
and meeting the needs of our cooking, and he said 
that it would meet all of the needs of our cooking, 
so far as regarding the frying and baking and boil-
ing (R. 63). 
He said he had an oven in his home and were 
thrilled with its performance (R. 63). 
That it cooked everything and was used in 
their family and cooked everything that they needed 
cooked (R. 63, 64). 
He emphasized that 'this is all you need for 
your cooking' when asked again if other cooking 
units were necessary (R. 64). 
The respondents told Nickles that they were 
planning to build a new house and would plan on 
using this unit if they purchased it. And again 
Nickles said it would be the only unit they would 
need for cooking (R. 64, 65). 
Mr. Nickles admits telling the Sohms that all 
of the other cooking units could be taken out and 
were not necessary with the exception of a small 
service unit for cooking pancakes (R. 138) and also 
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admits having told the Sohms that the electronic 
range would cook the various components of a meal 
in a matter of minutes (R. 139). 
I call the honorable court's attention to the answers 
of Mr. Nickles on cross examination where he repeatedly 
made statements completely contradictory to the testimony 
of other witnesses or, in lieu thereof, equivocated and 
avoided answering (R. 139-142). The same course of con-
duct was followed by the appellant in answering admis-
sions and interrogatories (R. 25, 26, 27), to which respon-
dents objected in their motion to require answers (R. 28). 
He denied telling Mrs. Peterson that the electronic 
range would be all she needed and denied knowing that the 
electronic range would be all she would have at' her house 
to cook with (R. 140), despite Mrs. Peterson's testimony 
to the contrary (R. 90, 91). Some progress was made with 
this· witness when Nickles did state that they made a prac-
tice of telling people about the limitations but ended up 
admitting the only limitations he knew of or would tell 
people about was that it would not cook pancakes (R. 141-
143). After a little deliberation Nickles added the making 
of taffy to the list of things it would not do. At first he 
stated it would fry eggs but ended up admitting it would 
not really fry eggs (R. 144). 
IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDING NO. 2B-"That the 
Electronic Range would fry eggs, bake bread, cook breakfast 
cereal and can fruit." The record is replete with evidence 
that such representations were made. 
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THE DEMONSTRATOR'S STATEMENTS AS TOLD 
BY WITNESS MRS. SOHM: 
The range cooked whole wheat breads, rolls 
and cookies efficiently. A whole wheat recipe would 
have to be obtained from the company but that it 
would bake bread ( R. 55, 56) . 
The electronic range could be used for cook-
ing whole grain mush (R. 57). 
That it would meet all of our needs in frying 
and baking and boiling (R. 63). 
I don't know exactly in regard to putting up 
fruit, but I will get the information for you. I a1n 
sure if it performs all of the cooking needs that it 
will do that also (R. 58). 
That it could put a roast in, and surround it 
with potatoes and carrots and it would cook within 
a matter of moments ( R. 60) . 
On cross examination the demonstrator was reluctant 
to state what she said in her presentation but answered as 
follows: 
"Q. Did someone ask you, 'Can you bake bread 
in this oven- this electronic range', what did you 
tell them? 
"A. I said, 'Yes'. 
"Q. If I asked you, 'Can you cook fruit in this 
electronic range', what is your answer? 
"A. I believe I said 'Yes' to that also (R. 162). 
"Q. Did you tell them they could fry foods in 
this electronic oven? 
"A. Yes, we fried bacon that night. 
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"Q. Did you tell them they could fry eggs in 
the electronic range? 
"A. I don't believe - I don't remember telling 
them that, but I have done it. 
"Q. You may have told them that? 
"A. I may have done, I don't remember specif-
ically (R. 162). 
"Q. Did you tell that they could cook a whole 
meal in a matter of minutes? 
"A. Yes. 
"THE COURT: About boiling potatoes, could 
you tell me anything about that? 
"A. Not specifically. In the course of the 
demonstration I would tell the people they could 
cook their vegetables in there (R~ 164) ." 
It appeared she had not tried boiling potatoes 
in any quantity (R. 164). 
"Q. Did you tell these parties they could cook 
cereal in the electronic range? 
"A. I probably did, because according to my 
information you could cook cereal (R. 165). 
"THE COURT: It wouldn't bake bread. 
"A. I haven't baked bread in it. 
"A. I did not cook any bread products, cake, 
yes (R. 167). 
"Q. Did you have trouble cooking cereal? 
"A. I did not cook it" (R. 168). 
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MR. NICKLES' STATEMENTS AS TOLD BY WIT-
NESS, MRS. SOHM: 
It would meet all of the needs of our cooking, 
so far as regarding the frying and baking and boil-
ing, and we went over details in regards to cooking 
(R. 63). 
We asked him about baking, and cooking for 
the family, and he said that it cooked everything 
and they used it in their family. I said I had four 
children. He said they had a small family, but it 
was very efficient for their use, and cooked every-
thing that they needed cooked (R. 64). At the time 
we were in his office we were assured it would 
cover all our cooking needs in regards to frying, 
baking and cooking ( R. 65) . 
We were told by Nickles and also the demon-
strator that we could - it would cover all of these 
needs- our cooking needs completely (R. 65). 
IN SUPPORT OF FINDING NO. 2C-"That cooking 
could be done in regular tableware including melmac" -the 
following representations were made : 
"The demonstrator said they could take dishes 
right off the table and put food in the electronic 
range, and put it back on the table and eat from it. 
When asked about Melmac, the demonstrator said, 
'Perfectly all right'" (R. 55). 
On cross examination the demonstrator said: 
"Q. Did you tell them they could use any type 
of dishware in the electronic oven? 
"A. Yes (R. 162). 
"Q. Did you ever cook on Melmac? 
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"A. No, I did not. 
"Q. In the literature you got from Westing-
house was there any representation you could use 
Melmac or other types of dish ware? 
"A. No, there was not." 
Thereafter the respondents, believing the words of Mr. 
Nickles and the demonstrator, and relying on them agreed 
to purchase the range. They would not have purchased the 
range if they had not believed the representations were 
true (R. 65). 
The electronic range was purchased on a note calling 
for the payment of $1613 based on an actual purchase price 
from appellant of $1195 (R. 66, Ex. 2, 5). 
POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENTS RELIED ON THE REP-
RESENTATIONS TO THEIR DAMAGE, THAT 
THEY WERE FALSE AND THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS AND 
IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE RESPONDENTS AGAINST APPELLANT. 
There is more than ample evidence that the represen-
tations were false. 
RESPONDENT'S EXPERIENCE: 
Would not fry eggs, it would only bake them. 
They were not palatable and no one cared for them. 
They were drier and hard and did not have the fla-
vor a fried egg has (R. 68). 
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The egg was on the rubbery side. It had yel-
low exposed and very little white on it - the yolk 
was dried (R. 69). 
I attempted to fry pork chops and hamburger, 
but they were more or less baked also. The pork 
chops came out dry and unpalatable (R. 69). 
They had to buy only certain cuts of meat. 
Regular cuts would not cook through and it took 
too long to cook. Steaks were dry and unsatisfac-
tory (R. 70). 
Baked cookies were not good. They were very 
dry, and trying to brown them made them even 
drier (R. 70). 
Bread would not raise or bake (R. 70). It was 
dry and hard (R. 71). 
I tried to cook mush and in the proportions 
we needed for a family, it kept boiling over. I kept 
getting a larger dish and it kept going over. There 
was no way of turning the unit down low enough 
to cook that - low enough to keep it from boiling 
over. It kept boiling over in my oven and then burn 
(R. 71). 
I tried to boil potatoes, the larger quantity of 
potatoes I put in, the more difficult it was to boil. 
The water just boiled over and I could not find a 
large enough container to boil my potatoes in it. I 
couldn't cut the heat of the oven down sufficiently 
to keep it from boiling over (R. 73). 
Couldn't cook whole dinners (R. 73). 
Cooking green beans was difficult. They would 
not cook through. Also making chili, or cooking dry 
beans. They never did get done. They were not 
palatable, they were just hard, and especially the 
kind, if they were hard (R. 74). 
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Anything that didn't have moisture in the 
food, wouldn't cook, anything dry. If you put in 
macaroni or spaghetti in the water in the oven, it 
didn't cook (R. 74). 
Not satisfactory for party groups (R. 75). 
The range could not cook mush, bake bread, 
bake cookies or fry eggs (R. 82). 
NICKLES' STATEMENTS: 
On examination by the Court, Nickles ad-
mitted the Electronic Range would not "cook any 
food that is the result of a cooking technique. It 
would not make taffy" (R. 153). 
"THE COURT: You do not get fried eggs out 
of the equipment? 
"NICKLES: No, sir. 
"THE COURT: What else wouldn't it do, be-
sides fry eggs, cook pancakes and make taffy? 
"NICKLES: It wouldn't cook food, some food 
as we are accustomed to preparing them" (R. 144). 
In response to Court questions the witness tried to find 
a recipe for bread but all of the recipes appeared to be for 
rolls or cakes or muffins (R. 145, 146). Mr. Nickles had 
to admit there were no conventional recipes for bread and 
that none of the referred to products had yeast in them 
(R. 146). The witness began to hedge at specific questions 
about cooking and finally admitted he did not know any-
thing about its cooking processes and did not know what 
it would or would not do (R. 148). 
Mr. Nickles did not remember telling Mrs. Sohm that 
he did not think the unit in his own home was satisfactory 
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and did not recall saying the range was made "to be sold 
and not to be used". The question was put to Mrs. Sohm 
if she heard the statement to which she responded: 
"Yes, right after we had our depositions at this 
lawyer's office, and he said, 'Since this is off the 
record- I said are you using your electronic range 
right now?' and he said - he laughed and said, 'No 
they are to be sold not to be used' " ( R. 153) . 
Mrs. Peterson had a similar experience, bread was like 
rocks (R. 93). Potatoes would boil over (R. 94). Westing-
house demonstrator said it definitely could not bake bread 
(R. 97). 
Mrs. Sohm tried over long periods of time to use it. 
Would call Nickles then try carefully to follow recipes as 
he suggested but it was completely unsatisfactory (R. 83). 
Respondents even wrote to Westinghouse several times 
with no success (R. 76, 77). 
The unit was checked and proved to be in proper op-
erating condition (R. 111, 122). 
Nickles said it was a revolutionary method of cooking 
and would save hours in the kitchen (R. 108). Respon-
dent's experience was that because of the quantity of food 
to be cooked for their family (six all together) it took about 
the same length of time as a conventional set of cooking 
units (R. 108). Respondent tried to follow the range menus 
including putting meat in first and then other items but 
this did not work satisfactorily (R. 108). Attempts to cook 
twelve potatoes for Thanksgiving dinner showed that it 
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took as long or longer to cook in electronic range than in 
conventional oven. If some were small they were overdone 
while larger potatoes were not quite done (R. 108). The 
small potatoes were very dry and hard on the outside -
dehydrated (R. 109). Peas would be burned while potatoes 
were still uncooked (R. 108, 113). They could not be cooked 
as represented (R. 113). It was a big headache to open 
and shut the door trying to take things out and in. By the 
time some foods were done and put aside to get something 
else done the ones put aside were cold (R. 113). 
As to the Melmac, Exhibit 6 is a plate which shows 
clearly that Melmac was not usable in the oven as repre-
sented. It was removed from the oven before it was too 
badly burned ( R. 72) . 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents believed the words of Appellant and 
his employee and in relying on them purchased the range 
( R. 65) . No question is raised concerning the measure or 
amount of damages but the record shows that Respondents 
paid a total of $403.35 in payments to C.I.T. on the loan 
and mitigated further damages by settling with C.I.T. at 
a figure of $325 balance after giving timely notice of their 
intent to appellant (R. 30) for a total loss of $728.35 (R. 
41, 77). 
The lower court summed up the key problem here in its 
discussion with opposing counsel when it stated: 
"The statement is, 'This will do anything an 
ordinary stove with surface unit and oven will do.' 
If they take the stove home and find out it won't 
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fry eggs, bake bread, wouldn't cook pancakes, you 
have got a misrepresentation. You can do enough 
things to cook a meal on a stove that costs a few 
dollars, but if you are going to pay $1600 you want 
one really to do something" (R. 167). 
The statements in question here are not mere puffing 
particularly when considering the cost of the range in-
volved herein. The representations referred to herein were 
deliberately calculated statements dsigned to convince the 
respondents they were getting something more than a mere 
stove but a product worth $1600 or some $1300 more than 
value of other ranges new. This took high powered sales 
techniques, the appellant knew it and did not hesitate to 
make whatever statements he felt necessary to make the 
sales. 
In answer to the court's questions witness Nickles re-
peatedly stated he did not know what the range would or 
would not cook and did not know what was in the Westing-
house literature (R. 147, 148). And yet he made the 1nany 
representations referred to in Argument No. I in a delib-
erate, well calculated manner. If he did not know the rep-
resentations were untrue he should have known and should 
not have stated them recklessly without ascertaining their 
truthfulness. This agrees with his answer to admissions 
where he was asked if he was given literature and knew 
the limitations of the Electronic Range before the sales 
program commenced and he answered "No" (R. 19, 25). 
The Appellant cannot excuse himself by saying that 
he only said what Westinghouse said. The Westinghouse 
literature and this record is devoid of evidence to show 
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Westinghouse said the range could do any of the things 
represented in Finding Number 2. Counsel for Appellant 
has not succeeded in so showing anywhere in his brief. 
The Appellant tries to make something out of the fact 
that the Sohms recommended the unit to relatives, the 
Moffetts, who made a purchase also but this argument was 
discounted entirely when it was determined that the pur-
chase date of Moffetts was July 13 or July 14 (R. 156). 
Clearly before the Sohms had a chance to use their unit 
more than a few days since their return from vacation 
about July 10. 
Counsel for appellants tried to show that respondents 
discovered these limitations and yet kept the oven (R. 115, 
116) but respondents indicated they felt they had to keep 
it because of the contracts and were told by Mr. Nickles and 
C.I.T. that they would do nothing, that we had signed a 
contract, were obligated and that was that. 
The Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3, Sees. 525, 527, and 
529 clearly state the law applicable in this case: 
"No. 525. One who fraudulently makes a mis-
representation of fact, opinion, intention or law 
for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain 
from action in reliance thereon in a business trans-
action is liable to the other for the harm caused to 
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepre-
sentation. 
"No. 527. A representation in a business trans-
action which the maker knows to be capable of two 
interpretations, the one false and the other true, if 
made with the intention that it be understood in the 
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sense in which it is false is a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation. 
"No. 529. A statement in a business transac-
tion which while stating the truth so far as it goes, 
the maker knows or believes to be materially mis-
leading because of his failure to state qualifying 
matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation. 
"Comment (a) A statement containing a half 
truth may be as misleading as a statement wholly 
false. A statement which contains only those matter 
which are favorable and omits all reference to those 
which are unfavorable is as much false representa-
tion as if all the facts were untrue." 
23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 76-83 says: 
"Half truths are cometimes worse than a lie 
and when a person makes a material representation 
concerning the property involved or his intentions 
in regards thereto, he must speak the whole truth, 
and a suppression of a part of the fact is fraud 
when made to induce a person to act to his damage. 
A half truth spoken with a design of influencing 
the opposite party to act where he has not an equal 
means of knowledge is of itself fraudulent." 
In this case the appellant had an Electronic Range in 
his own home (R. 64) and had been connected with dem-
onstration in his own office (R. 54, 55, 160) and had a 
demonstrator who had experimented considerably with the 
Range (R. 164, 165). He knew of its limitations and weak-
nesses and yet withheld this information and stated half 
truths as well as making bold false statements in order to 
accomplish the sale. 
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Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 145, clearly sets out the 
elements of fraud and emphasizes an alternative to the 4th 
element "which representor either (a) knew to be false or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing he had insufficient knowl-
edge upon which to base such representations." Either al-
ternative could apply to appellant. 
Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 164, 27 P. 2d 56, 58, 
further emphasizes this well established Utah Law. In 
this case the defendant represented the company to be a 
big company with assets of from $75,000 to $100,000; that 
it was as safe as any bank in Ogden, and its bonds were 
as good as gold coin of like amount. The court held that 
while some of the statements were matters of opinion yet 
some were: 
"Representation of fact, and, if untrue, and 
known by the officer at time to be untrue or made 
with reckless disregard of truth furnished grounds 
for an action in deceit." 
The Hull case also gives us clearly the Utah law as to 
relief for fraud : 
"The rule is well settled that one who has been 
induced, through fraud, to enter into a contract has 
the election either to rescind, tendering back that 
which he has received, or, affirming the contract, 
he may have his action for deceit to recover the dam-
ages sustained." 
The Range in this case was regularly tendered back to 
appellants (R. 11, 30, 127). 
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The Court should consider this case in the same light 
as the Court did in the Greenwell v. Duvall case, 9 Utah 2d 
89, 93, 338 P. 2d 118, where it stated: 
"Only a glowing picture of a fleeting chance to 
make some money would induce an ordinary busi-
ness man to make such an investment so quickly. 
That such a picture was represented to plaintiff by 
defendant is in full accord with plaintiff's testimony 
and actions, though contrary to the testimony of 
the defendant." 
We agree with the fundamental elements required to 
prove fraudulent statements and submit respectfully that 
we have met the test in this case in showing that these were 
representations of an existing fact; that the statements were 
false; that they are material statements; that the defendant 
had knowledge or should have known they were false and 
nevertheless, recklessly and with intent to induce the pur-
chase made the statements; that respondents relied on the 
representations and were ignorant of their falsity and, in 
fact, had a right to rely on them as being true; they acted 
upon this reliance and were injured as a consequence. Pace 
v. Parish, 122 Utah 141. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH E. SOHM, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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